Glossary
Words this landscape overloads
Each term links to the spec or flow that defines it. On the boards, a token is a pass, a signature is a wax seal, Bearer is a photocopy, and DPoP is a pass glued to a key.
- Access token
- Credential the client presents to a resource server. In OAuth 2.0 it may be opaque; RFC 9068 profiles it as a JWT (typ at+jwt). It is not an ID Token.
- SpecJWT access tokensSpecBearer tokensFlowUser-delegated agent calling APIs
- act (actor) claim
- RFC 8693 JWT claim recording that the token presenter is acting for the subject. Nested act objects represent multi-hop delegation (A then B then C).
- SpecToken ExchangeFlowMulti-hop on-behalf-of (Token Exchange + chaining)
- Agent
- In this landscape: software that iteratively calls a model and tools. IETF AIMS treats it as a workload. AAuth treats it as any HTTP client with its own key. DIDComm uses 'agent' for a wallet endpoint — not the same thing.
- SpecAIMS (agent auth BCP)SpecAAuthFlowUser-delegated agent calling APIsFlowPeer-to-peer: AAuth identity-based access
- Agent Card
- A2A JSON document at /.well-known/agent-card.json describing identity, skills, interfaces, and securitySchemes. Optional JWS proves integrity of the card, not of later requests.
- SpecA2A (Agent2Agent)FlowAgent-to-agent tasks (A2A)
- Agent token (AAuth)
- JWT of type aa-agent+jwt binding an agent identifier to a signing key (cnf.jwk). Presented via the Signature-Key header, not as a bearer Authorization token.
- SpecAAuthFlowPeer-to-peer: AAuth identity-based access
- Audience (aud)
- Who is intended to accept a token. Access tokens should be audience-restricted to the API (RFC 8707/9068). ID Tokens are audience-restricted to the client. Mix-ups here are a leading agent-security bug.
- SpecResource IndicatorsSpecJWT access tokensSpecOpenID Connect CoreFlowUser-delegated agent calling APIs
- Authorization server (AS)
- OAuth role that authenticates the resource owner (often via OIDC), authenticates the client, and issues tokens. AAuth's 'access server' is the resource-side cousin in four-party mode.
- SpecOAuth 2.0SpecAAuthFlowUser-delegated agent calling APIsCompareUser-delegated vs p2p agent-to-agent
- Bearer token
- A token that grants access to whoever presents it. RFC 6750. Contrast sender-constrained tokens (DPoP, mTLS, HTTP Message Signatures).
- SpecBearer tokensSpecDPoPSpecmTLS sender-constrained tokensFlowUser-delegated agent calling APIs
- CIBA
- Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication: the client starts auth/consent without a browser redirect; the user approves on another device.
- SpecCIBAFlowHuman-in-the-loop via CIBA
- CIMD
- Client ID Metadata Document: the client_id is an HTTPS URL the AS fetches. WG draft; MCP prefers this over Dynamic Client Registration.
- SpecClient ID Metadata DocumentsSpecDynamic Client RegistrationFlowAgent host as OAuth client (MCP HTTP)
- client_id
- Identifier of an OAuth client at one authorization server. Not a global agent identity. AAuth exists partly because this identifier does not travel.
- SpecOAuth 2.0SpecAAuthCompareAAuth vs vanilla OAuth
- Confidential vs public client
- Confidential clients can keep a secret (or private key) on a server. Public clients cannot (browsers, many native apps, many local agents). OAuth 2.1 simplifies the distinction to 'has credentials or not'.
- SpecOAuth 2.1CompareOAuth 2.0 vs OAuth 2.1
- Confused deputy
- A client with delegated authority is tricked into using it at the wrong resource or for the wrong purpose. Audience restriction, PKCE, and actor claims are mitigations.
- SpecResource IndicatorsSpecPKCESpecToken ExchangeCompareUser-delegated vs p2p agent-to-agent
- DPoP
- Demonstrating Proof of Possession: per-request signed JWT binding an OAuth access token to a client key without requiring mTLS.
- SpecDPoPFlowUser-delegated agent calling APIs
- Dynamic Client Registration (DCR)
- RFC 7591: POST metadata to mint a client_id at runtime. MCP 2026-07-28 deprecates it in favor of CIMD.
- SpecDynamic Client RegistrationSpecClient ID Metadata Documents
- FAPI 2.0
- OIDF high-security profile of OAuth (PAR, PKCE, sender-constrained tokens, …) used in open banking and other high-value APIs.
- SpecFAPI 2.0
- GNAP
- Grant Negotiation and Authorization Protocol (RFC 9635). A completed IETF alternative to OAuth, not an OAuth extension and not wire-compatible.
- SpecGNAP
- ID Token
- OpenID Connect JWT authenticating the user to the client. Never send it to an API as if it were an access token.
- SpecOpenID Connect CoreCompareOpenID Connect vs OAuth
- ID-JAG / XAA
- Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant, informally Cross-App Access: IdP mints a JWT grant for another app's AS so an agent/app can call that API under enterprise policy.
- SpecCross-App Access (ID-JAG)SpecIdentity chaining
- Issuer (iss)
- Who minted a token or metadata document. Compare exactly. RFC 9207 puts iss in the authorization response to stop mix-up attacks.
- SpecAS issuer identificationSpecAS metadata
- JWT
- JSON Web Token (RFC 7519): a signed or encrypted claims container. Profiles (ID Token, at+jwt, WIT, aa-agent+jwt) decide the semantics.
- SpecJWT
- MCP
- Model Context Protocol: how model hosts expose and call tools. HTTP authorization is an OAuth 2.1 profile, not a new token type.
- SpecMCP authorizationFlowAgent host as OAuth client (MCP HTTP)
- MCP host
- The application that owns the model session and is the OAuth client in MCP HTTP — Claude Desktop, an IDE, a custom runtime. Distinct from the MCP server, which is the tool/resource. Stdio MCP is a local pipe and does not use the HTTP OAuth profile.
- SpecMCP authorizationFlowAgent host as OAuth client (MCP HTTP)
- Mission (AAuth)
- Optional natural-language description of what the agent intends, approved at the person server and bound by SHA-256. Governance that cannot be reduced to static scopes.
- SpecAAuthFlowAAuth three-party (PS-asserted user claims)
- Mix-up attack
- The client is tricked into mixing tokens or codes from two authorization servers. Mitigated by RFC 9207 iss and exact issuer metadata checks.
- SpecAS issuer identification
- On-behalf-of (OBO)
- Pattern where a service calls downstream as itself acting for a user. In IETF terms this is Token Exchange (RFC 8693) with subject and actor, not a separate grant name.
- SpecToken ExchangeFlowMulti-hop on-behalf-of (Token Exchange + chaining)
- PAR
- Pushed Authorization Requests (RFC 9126): POST the authorize parameters to the AS, redirect with a short request_uri.
- SpecPARFlowUser-delegated agent calling APIs
- Person server (PS)
- AAuth role representing the user: issues auth tokens, runs missions, permission, audit, and interaction. Orthogonal to which resource-access mode is in use.
- SpecAAuthFlowAAuth three-party (PS-asserted user claims)
- PKCE
- Proof Key for Code Exchange (RFC 7636). Stops authorization-code interception. Required for authorization-code clients in OAuth 2.1.
- SpecPKCESpecOAuth 2.1FlowUser-delegated agent calling APIsCompareOAuth 2.0 vs OAuth 2.1
- P2P (in this landscape)
- Overloaded. (1) AAuth identity-based or two-party access: agent↔resource with no AS. (2) A2A agent-to-agent communication. (3) did:peer / DIDComm pairwise identity. There is no IETF RFC titled 'P2P OAuth' in this cluster. The deployment matrix keeps those as separate rows.
- SpecAAuthSpecA2A (Agent2Agent)Specdid:peerFlowPeer-to-peer: AAuth identity-based accessFlowPeer-to-peer: AAuth two-party (resource-managed)CompareUser-delegated vs p2p agent-to-agent
- Protected Resource Metadata
- RFC 9728 JSON document a resource publishes so clients can discover its authorization servers and capabilities.
- SpecProtected Resource MetadataFlowUser-delegated agent calling APIs
- RAR
- Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396): structured authorization_details instead of only scopes.
- SpecRARSpecAAuth R3
- Resource owner
- OAuth term for the entity that can grant access — usually a human, sometimes an organization or the client itself (client-credentials).
- SpecOAuth 2.0
- Resource server (RS)
- The API or tool. In MCP HTTP, the MCP server is the RS. In AAuth, the 'resource' plays this role.
- SpecOAuth 2.0SpecMCP authorizationFlowUser-delegated agent calling APIs
- Scope
- Space-delimited OAuth permission strings. Too coarse for many tool calls; see RAR and AAuth R3.
- SpecOAuth 2.0SpecRAR
- Sender-constrained token
- An access token that can only be used by a presenter who proves a key (DPoP, mTLS certificate, HTTP signature). Contrast bearer.
- SpecDPoPSpecmTLS sender-constrained tokensSpecHTTP Message SignaturesFlowUser-delegated agent calling APIs
- Sidecar (mesh)
- A helper process next to a workload that presents SPIFFE/WIMSE identity, usually via mTLS. The agent binary is still the workload; the sidecar is how identity is injected. Unattended: there is no OIDC user sub on this hop.
- SpecSPIFFE / SPIRESpecWIMSE architectureFlowWorkload identity plus user delegation
- SPIFFE / SPIRE
- CNCF workload identity: SPIFFE IDs and SVIDs, typically issued by SPIRE from platform attestation. IETF WIMSE generalizes multi-system aspects.
- SpecSPIFFE / SPIRESpecWIMSE architectureFlowWorkload identity plus user delegation
- Step-up
- RFC 9470: the resource demands a stronger or fresher user authentication before serving a request.
- SpecStep-up authentication
- Transaction token (Txn-Token)
- Short-lived JWT propagating user, workload, and purpose across a call chain inside a trust domain. WG draft.
- SpecTransaction Tokens
- Person token (AAuth)
- Draft-11 JWT typ aa-person+jwt: a directed identifier of the person at one resource. Identifies, does not authorize. A resource MUST reject it where an auth token is required.
- SpecAAuthFlowAAuth three-party (PS-asserted user claims)
- Signature-Key
- HTTP header from draft-hardt-httpbis-signature-key that conveys or points at the public key for an RFC 9421 signature. AAuth puts the agent (or person/auth) JWT here with scheme=jwt.
- SpecHTTP Signature KeysSpecAAuthFlowPeer-to-peer: AAuth identity-based access
- WIMSE
- Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments: IETF WG architecture and credential drafts for workload identifiers, WIT/WIC, and proofs (WPT, HTTP signatures, mTLS).
- SpecWIMSE architectureFlowWorkload identity plus user delegation
- WIT / WPT
- Workload Identity Token (credential) and Workload Proof Token (per-request PoP). WIMSE drafts; WIT must not be used as a bearer token.
- SpecWIMSE credentialsSpecWIMSE WPTFlowWorkload identity plus user delegation
- Workload
- Software executing for a purpose, possibly many instances. AIMS: an agent is a workload. Distinct from the user it may serve.
- SpecWIMSE architectureSpecAIMS (agent auth BCP)FlowWorkload identity plus user delegation